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 Non-Technical Summary 
Financial markets in Europe become more and more integrated. The persisting 
fragmentation of financial supervision, however, constitutes a lasting obstacle to 
integration. Financial services providers operating in different European countries 
have to deal with a multitude of supervisory agencies and regulations. The outcome 
of this is additional costs that may, for instance, prevent firms from entering foreign 
markets, and hence hamper financial integration. 
Overall the costs resulting from supervisory fragmentation in Europe are manifold 
and complex. They range from the cost burden within financial companies, such as 
costs due to multiple reporting, up to general macroeconomic costs as a result of 
supervision related obstacles to market development and integration. The aim of this 
paper is to assess the costs that result from national fragmentation of financial 
supervisory systems in the EU. These costs are related to the potential savings from 
a reform of the supervisory framework towards a more cost-efficient system. 
To this end we employ a two step procedure. Firstly, a supervisory cost function is 
estimated for a large country cross-section. Due to data availability we focus the 
analysis on the institutional costs of banking supervision. Supervisory cost is 
explained by ‘supervisory output’ as well as several control variables. Thereby, the 
extent of economies of scale can be quantified. Secondly, we use these estimation 
results to predict the supervisory cost in a cost-efficient European supervisory 
system assuming that the economies of scale could be realised for the whole of the 
EU. The dimension of potential cost savings is then calculated by relating these 
predictions to the sum of the actual supervisory costs in the current national based 
framework. 
The results clearly indicate that there exists increasing economies of scale in 
banking supervision. An increase in supervisory output (measured by the size of the 
banking market) by one percent causes institutional supervisory cost (measured by 
supervisory staff) to rise by only some 0.5 percent. Based on these estimation results 
we predict institutional cost saving of around 15 percent in a plausible simulation 
scenario representing a cost-efficient European supervisory framework. 
 
 The Costs of Supervisory Fragmentation in 
Europe 
 
 
Martin Schüler and Friedrich Heinemann* 
 
 
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim 
 
 
January 2005 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Financial markets in Europe become more and more integrated. The persisting 
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1 Introduction 
Financial markets in Europe become more and more integrated. This holds true 
particularly with respect to wholesale financial markets. However, there still 
exist manifold obstacles impeding the development of a single retail financial 
market in Europe (European Commission, 2002; Heinemann and Jopp, 2002; 
Gual, 2004). One of these obstacles is the fragmentation of financial supervision 
and regulation in the European Union (EU).1 Financial services providers 
operating in different European countries have to deal with a multitude of 
supervisory agencies and regulations. The outcome of this is additional costs 
that may, for instance, prevent firms from entering foreign markets, and hence 
hamper financial integration. 
Overall the costs resulting from supervisory fragmentation in Europe are 
manifold and complex. They range from the cost burden within financial 
companies, such as costs due to multiple reporting, up to general 
macroeconomic costs as a result of supervision related obstacles to market 
development and integration. The aim of this paper is to assess the costs that 
result from national fragmentation of financial supervisory systems in the EU. 
These costs are related to the potential savings from a reform of the supervisory 
framework towards a more cost-efficient system. 
To this end we employ a two step procedure. Firstly, a supervisory cost function 
is estimated for a large country cross-section. Due to data availability we focus 
the analysis on the institutional costs of banking supervision. Supervisory cost is 
explained by ‘supervisory output’ as well as several control variables. Thereby, 
the extent of economies of scale can be quantified. Secondly, we use these 
estimation results to predict the supervisory cost in a cost-efficient European 
supervisory system assuming that the economies of scale could be realised for 
the whole of the EU. The dimension of potential cost savings is then calculated 
by relating these predictions to the sum of the actual supervisory costs in the 
current national based framework. 
The results clearly indicate that there exists increasing economies of scale in 
banking supervision. An increase in supervisory output (measured by the size of 
the banking market) by one percent causes institutional supervisory cost 
(measured by supervisory staff) to rise by only some 0.5 percent. Based on these 
estimation results we predict institutional cost saving of around 15 percent in a 
                                           
1 The notions supervision and regulation are used interchangeable. Note, moreover, that we do 
not differentiate between the EU and Europe. The notion EU refers to the EU 15, i.e. not 
the enlarged EU. 
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plausible simulation scenario representing a cost-efficient European supervisory 
framework. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2.1 gives a systematisation of the 
costs of supervision in general. Section 2.2 discusses the different costs that are 
due to fragmentation of financial supervision in the EU. Section 3 tries to 
quantify the excessive institutional costs. After describing the methodology and 
data (Section 3.1), the supervisory cost function is estimated (Section 3.2). 
Based on the estimations the potential costs savings are predicted in Section 3.3. 
Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
2 Costs of Financial Regulation 
2.1 A Systematisation 
The costs of financial supervision can be divided into three classes of costs 
(Goodhart et al., 1998; Alfon and Andrews, 1999; Briault, 2003): 
1. Institutional costs of running supervisory agencies which arise in the state 
sector. 
2. Costs of compliance that can be attributed to the regulated firms, i.e. the 
producers. 
3. Structural or distortion costs which arise in the (financial) market. 
For an illustration of the costs of financial regulation see Figure 1. 
   - insert Figure 1 about here - 
Institutional costs are the costs which emerge by running regulatory authorities. 
These costs are usually borne by the regulated industry through fees which often 
cover the supervisory authority’s full budget. In this case they can be regarded 
as the financial industry’s direct regulatory costs which are part of the industry’s 
compliance costs. 
The costs of compliance are the costs which are imposed on regulated firms, 
namely the producers, through regulation. The producer’s costs of regulation 
consist of operating and opportunity costs (Elliehausen, 1998). 
Operating costs comprise all cost factors which arise from the active compliance 
with regulatory requirements (e.g., disclosure and reporting requirements) in 
addition to the fees (direct costs) that are used to finance the supervisory 
agencies. These costs comprise all expenses that are generated in this context: 
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employee time, material, and equipment as well as managerial effort and 
training must be devoted to implementing required actions and ensuring 
compliance with the regulation. This includes in particular labour costs, 
information technology costs, and costs for equipment, supplies and premises. In 
addition, particularly when implementing new regulation – for example when 
entering a new (foreign) market – external legal assistance and consultancy is 
required. 
Opportunity costs arise for the financial firm when regulation prevents it from 
engaging in profitable activities. Regulation may, for instance, discourage or 
even prevent firms from expanding their activities to other (e.g., foreign) 
markets. Thereby, a firm is not allowed to take advantage of profitable business 
outside its local area and, in addition, is made vulnerable to downturns in local 
business conditions. Another opportunity cost is the interest foregone due to 
capital requirements. The firms’ opportunity costs constitute a part of the 
structural costs. 
Structural costs arise from the way in which regulation effects markets. 
Regulation may change the nature of markets, may prevent or discourage firms 
from entering or using markets, and may constitute new markets that would not 
exist in the absence of regulation. Thus, regulation may have a significant effect 
on the nature and availability of financial products. In particular, structural costs 
include, e.g., possible impairment of competition, stifling of innovation, 
regulatory capture, and regulatory escalation (regulation becomes excessively 
burdensome over time). This type of cost, though extremely hard to measure 
precisely, is of paramount importance in the context of the imperfect single 
financial market which has to be regarded as one of the responsible factors for 
the poor European growth performance. 
2.2 The Costs of Fragmentation of Supervision in Europe 
The focus of this paper is not on the overall costs of financial regulation. 
Instead, the leading question is the following: What are the costs due to the 
national fragmentation of supervisory systems in the EU? To put it differently, 
what is the cost saving potential from a reform of the European supervisory 
system towards a more efficient framework?  
Note at this point that our exercise does not necessarily presuppose that Europe 
would need a centralised supervisory system. It might well be the case that 
improved coordination and intelligent concepts such as lead supervision 
approaches could be able to reap substantial economies of scale even within a 
decentralised system with continuing strong responsibilities of the national 
agencies. Hence, when we talk in the following of a cost-efficient European 
supervisory system we leave it open how centralised this system has to be. 
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The systematisation of supervisory costs given in the previous section is helpful 
to identify the different types of excess costs under the status quo. 
Firstly, there are additional institutional costs due to the fact that instead of 
having a cost-efficient European supervisory system there are 15 (and even 
more since sometimes there are multiple supervisors in one country) national 
financial supervisors with sub-optimal coordination. Cost savings in this context 
rely on the assumption of economies of scale in supervision, i.e. that an increase 
in the ‘supervisory output’ leads to an increase in the associated (institutional) 
costs of supervision by a factor of less than one. 
These additional institutional costs constitute in turn additional direct 
compliance costs to the financial firms as firms fund supervisory budgets 
through fees. 
Secondly, supervisory fragmentation leads to a variety of other additional 
compliance costs to financial institutions. These arise particularly due to 
multiple reporting requirements. In the EU, at present, the financial reporting 
requirements are not harmonised or co-ordinated. Thus, the multiplicity of 
underlying regulatory requirements across countries lead to fragmented 
reporting systems at the firm level which restrict the institutions’ ability to 
achieve efficiency in reporting (Forum Group, 2002). Reporting requirements 
differ with respect to, e.g., the definitions and classifications of the requested 
reporting items; the frequency and dates of the requested time-tables; the 
required level of detail; and the technical formats. This fragmentation leads to 
additional indirect costs in the form of, e.g., additional workforce, IT, and other 
equipment. 
Finally, multiple reporting requirements lead to additional opportunity costs to 
the firms. Differences in regulatory regimes among EU countries constitute a 
barrier to entry of new foreign markets (Heinemann and Jopp, 2002; Forum 
Group, 2002). Consequently, firms are prevented from engaging in profitable 
activities. At a macroeconomic level this constitutes additional structural costs 
of financial supervision since supervisory fragmentation exhibits a significant 
obstacle to financial market integration. 
Assessing the costs of fragmentation of supervisory regimes in the EU in a 
quantitative manner is difficult – probably even more difficult than quantifying 
the overall costs of regulation. In particular, it is hard to reasonably assess the 
structural costs of regulation since this requires knowledge about the state of 
markets that would occur in the absence of regulation. Quantifying appropriately 
the compliance costs to the firms would require detailed surveys and interviews. 
These approaches face the difficulty that for a large financial services provider it 
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is hardly possible even to identify all regulatory costs, not to mention separation 
of the costs that are due to multiplicity of the regulatory requirements. 
Due to these problems, and hence data availability with respect to the structural 
and the compliance costs, we focus on the institutional costs of supervision. 
Although, data on the institutional costs is also scarce, there is some cross-
country data available on budget and staff size for banking supervision. Thus, 
the focus of the quantitative analysis is on banking supervision only. 
Employing a large cross-country database we try to estimate economies of scale 
in banking supervisory activity. Based on these estimations we try to assess the 
excessive institutional costs that are due to a fragmentation of supervision in the 
EU.  
3 Quantification of Excessive Institutional Costs 
3.1 Methodology and Data 
The aim of this paper is to assess the excess institutional costs arising from the 
fragmentation of banking supervision in the EU. To this end, the analysis 
proceeds in two steps: 
Firstly, a supervisory cost function is estimated for a large country cross-section. 
The cost of banking supervision is explained by ‘supervisory output’ as well as 
several control variables. Thereby, the extent of the economies of scale can be 
quantified.2 
Secondly, based on the estimation results we identify the potential cost savings 
for the EU assuming that the economies of scale could be realised for the whole 
of the EU and that we would have a cost-efficient European supervisory system. 
This is done by comparing the sum of the actual costs of running supervisory 
agencies in the present national based framework with the counterfactual of 
having a cost-efficient European supervisory framework. This counterfactual is 
obtained by inserting the values of the explanatory variables for the whole of the 
EU in the estimated supervisory cost function. 
                                           
2 Goodhart et al. (2002) find evidence for economies of scale in supervision. They, however, 
focus on the staffing and expertise supervisory institutions employ in an attempt to shed 
more light on the question of which structure may do better. Employing a larger cross-
country dataset, we focus on the determinants of staff from the perspective of the costs of 
supervision. 
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With regard to the first step, we estimate a cost function of the Cobb-Douglas 
type. The cost of supervision is assumed to depend on supervisory output in a 
non-linear way which allows for economies of scale. By estimating this non-
linear cost function in logarithms we can apply ordinary least squares estimation 
methods. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as 
elasticities. In addition to the supervisory output we include several explanatory 
variables to control for market characteristics, supervisory structure, as well as 
the macro-economy. Thus, the following model is estimated: 
ln(cost of supervision) ln(supervisory output) ln(control variables)α β γ ε= + + + . 
We use the following variables as proxies for the cost of supervision and 
supervisory output. For a detailed description of the variables as well as the data 
source see Table A1 in the Appendix. Summary statistics are shown in Table 
A2; and Table A3 displays the countries included in the sample. 
Our database comprises two variables representing the cost of banking 
supervision as the dependent variable: Total budget for banking supervision 
(BUDGET) and total number of professional bank supervisors (STAFF). 
Supervisory budget is a direct measure for the cost of supervision. When using 
STAFF as a proxy for supervisory cost we assume that labour cost is the only 
cost factor and that it is directly proportional to the rest of the costs. This 
corresponds to the assumption that the underlying production function has only 
labour as an input factor which is necessary since data on capital is not 
available. However, this seems to be a reasonable assumption. 
As proxies for the supervisory output we include bank assets (ASSETS), 
deposits (DEPOSITS), claims (CLAIMS), and the number of banks (BANKS). 
One would expect the coefficient associated with supervisory output to be 
positive and less than one, indicating that an increase in the size of the banking 
market of one percent leads to a rise in supervisory cost by only less than one 
(increasing economies of scale). 
In addition, we include three classes of control variables: 
Banking market structure: 
We include control variables characterising the banking market. In particular 
one would expect supervisory cost to be lower in more concentrated and 
homogeneous banking markets. Thus, we include concentration measures such 
as the percentage of assets (CONCA) and deposits (CONCD) accounted for by the 
largest banks, respectively; and the interest rate spread, i.e. the lending minus 
the deposit rate (DRATES). 
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Regarding the homogeneity, we construct the variable HOMOGEN. This variable 
is the sum of the squared percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that are 
50% or more government owned, foreign owned, and privately domestic owned, 
respectively. By definition this variable ranges from 0.33 to 1; 1 indicating the 
highest degree of homogeneity. This variable is also very important for the 
following simulation in order to assess the potential costs savings with a more 
centralised European supervisory system. The European banking market as a 
whole is of course far more heterogeneous than any national banking market. 
Moreover, we include non-performing loans (NPL) as an indication for the 
soundness of the banking market. A more fragile banking market is expected to 
be more costly to supervise. However, there may be a problem of causality since 
the quality of supervision, and hence also the supervisory cost, should have an 
effect on the non-performing loans ratio. 
Features of the supervisory system: 
We also include control variables characterising the supervisory system. 
Supervisory cost may depend on the number of supervisory authorities. 
Therefore, we include a dummy variable taking a value of one if there exists 
more than one bank supervisory authority (MULTI). Moreover, dummy 
variables are included that indicate whether the central bank is involved in bank 
supervision (CB), and whether there exists explicit deposit insurance (DI). 
Other control variables: 
Finally we include variables representing the development of the economy and 
regional contexts, namely GDP per capita (GDPCAP) and regional dummies for 
OECD, EU15, EWU, and EU25 countries. 
Our database comprises 113 countries with data for the years 1999 and 2002 
giving us a maximum of 226 observations. 
We estimate a pooled linear regression model of the general form. In other 
words, we assume that the intercept, the slope coefficients, and the error 
variances are homogeneous, i.e. constant across countries and time. This is 
reasonable because of the following: First, we control explicitly for a multitude 
of factors measuring heterogeneity. Moreover, since our data set comprises only 
two years and this even not for all countries, estimation of a fixed effects model 
as well as a random effects model would leave us with very few degrees of 
freedom. With respect to structural changes over time, we apply a Chow test to 
several different model specifications. The result is that coefficients of the 
model estimated with only 2002 data do not significantly differ to the 
coefficients of the model estimated with 1999 data. 
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3.2 Estimation of the Cost Function 
We estimate several specifications with either the number of bank supervisors 
(STAFF) or the supervisory budget (BUDGET) as the proxy for supervisory cost, 
i.e. the dependant variable. 
Estimations with STAFF as the supervisory cost variable 
Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 report the results for the regressions with STAFF as the 
dependant variable and ASSETS, DEPOSITS, CLAIMS, and BANKS as the 
supervisory output variable, respectively. In addition to the supervisory output 
variable we included in all regressions (i) the variable HOMOGEN; (ii) a measure 
of the concentration of the banking market (CONCA in combination with 
ASSETS, CLAIMS, and BANKS; CONCD in combination with DEPOSITS, 
CLAIMS, and BANKS; and DRATES in combination with all supervisory output 
variables); (iii) GDP per capita (GDPCAP); and (iv) a constant. 
   - insert Tables 1, 2, and 3 about here - 
The regressions with ASSETS, DEPOSITS, and CLAIMS as the proxy for 
supervisory output give very similar results. The coefficient associated with 
supervisory output is significantly positive and less than one in all 
specifications. In the case of ASSETS the coefficient takes values of around 
0.50/0.51; in the case of DEPOSITS of around 0.49; and in the case of CLAIMS 
between 0.42 and 0.46. This, indicates that a one percent rise in supervisory 
output increases supervisory staff by some 0.5 percent. In other words there are 
increasing economies of scale, which promise cost savings when moving 
towards a more centralised supervisory framework in the EU. 
The constructed homogeneity variable is, as expected, significantly negative. 
The more homogeneous the banking market, the lower is the number of bank 
supervisors. To put it differently, more heterogeneous banking markets are more 
costly to supervise. 
The coefficient associated with the concentration in the banking sector (CONCA 
and CONCD) is in all specifications negative and in most of the cases significant. 
In particular in the regressions with DEPOSITS and CLAIMS as the supervisory 
output variables the concentration measures are highly significant. These results 
confirm the hypothesis that higher concentrated banking markets require fewer 
supervisory staff since they are less costly to supervise. 
Using the interest rate spread (DRATES) as an indirect measure of the 
concentration in the banking sector the coefficient turns out to be not significant 
(equations (7), (8), and (9)). The insignificant coefficient is positive which is in 
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contrast to expectations, since a large interest rate spread should indicate higher 
concentration. 
The non-performing loan ratio as a control variable for the soundness of the 
banking system does not significantly effect supervisory staff size in most 
regressions. The coefficient is significantly positive only in a few specifications 
(equation (6) in Table 1 and 2, respectively). A higher non-performing loans 
ratio is associated with higher supervisory staff which means that a more fragile 
banking system causes higher supervisory cost. However, there may be a 
problem of causality since supervisory staff may influence non-performing 
loans. We therefore exclude NPL from most of the regressions, which is also 
reasonable since the coefficient is mostly insignificant anyway. 
We include three variables controlling for the structure of the supervisory 
system: a dummy variable indicating whether there are multiple bank 
supervisors (MULTI), the central bank is involved in banking supervision (CB), 
and there is explicit deposit insurance (DI), respectively. MULTI is statistically 
not significant. Also the coefficient doesn’t even take the expected sign. It 
usually is negative, indicating that countries with more than one bank 
supervisory authority have fewer bank supervisors. The dummy variable CB is 
significantly positive in some specifications. Countries where the central bank is 
involved in bank supervision have ceteris paribus higher supervisory staff.3 
Moreover, the dummy DI is positive and highly significant in all regressions. 
The existence of explicit deposit insurance is associated with higher supervisory 
staff. This is reasonable since deposit insurance may cause moral hazard 
behaviour of banks resulting in higher supervisory cost. 
As a macroeconomic control variable we include GDP per capita which turns 
out to be highly significant with a negative sign. Richer countries employ ceteris 
paribus fewer staff to supervise the banking system. One reason for that may be 
lower efficiency and cheaper labour costs in poorer countries. 
In addition, we include several regional dummies indicating whether a country 
belongs to the OECD, the EU15, the EWU, and the EU25, respectively. None of 
these dummy variables turns out to be significant. The reason for that may be 
that we control for country differences by including GDP per capita. The results 
of these regressions are therefore not reported. 
                                           
3 Goodhart et al. (2002) find a similar result and wonder whether this could be due to a 
stronger funding position of Central Banks. 
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Basically the same results are found when using the number of banks (BANKS) 
as a proxy for supervisory output instead of ASSETS, DEPOSITS, and CLAIMS 
(see Table 4). 
   - insert Table 4 about here - 
Most importantly the economies of scale hypothesis is supported. Moreover, the 
concentration measures (in particular CONCD) are significantly negative; and 
also the deposit insurance dummy is highly significant with a positive sign. 
However, HOMOGEN and GDPCAP are mostly not significant, although taking 
the expected sign. 
Overall, the R-squares of these regressions are relatively low (between 0.55 and 
0.57) as compared to the regressions with ASSETS, DEPOSITS, and CLAIMS 
as the output variable where R-squares usually range between 0.65 and 0.71. 
Estimations with BUDGET as the supervisory cost variable 
In addition to the regressions with STAFF as the proxy for supervisory cost we 
run several specifications using the total budget of supervisory authorities 
(BUDGET) as the dependant variable. 
   - insert Table 5 about here - 
With respect to our main explanatory variable, the supervisory output, the same 
results emerge: an increase in supervisory output by one percent results in an 
increase in supervisory budget by less than one percent. In other words, the 
economies of scale hypothesis is endorsed. 
The concentration variables are mostly significantly negative, confirming that a 
more concentrated banking market causes lower supervisory cost. As opposed to 
the STAFF-regressions DRATES, the interest rates spread, is significant and 
positive. This, doesn’t go with DRATES as a proxy for the banking market 
concentration, since one would expect a negative sign (higher interest rate 
spread indicating higher concentration). However, DRATES may rather measure 
efficiency of the banking market. In this case a negative sign would indicate that 
more efficient banking markets are associated with lower supervisory cost. 
Most of the other control variables, in particular HOMOGEN and GDPCAP are not 
significant and/or do not have the expected sign. 
Due to lack of data for bank supervisory budgets the number of observations is 
relatively low (between 80 and 90). Besides, the regressions exhibit relatively 
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low R-squares. Therefore, we rely in the next step of the analysis on the 
estimations with STAFF as the supervisory cost variable. 
3.3 Prediction of Potential Cost Savings 
We use the regression results from the preceding section to identify the potential 
cost savings for the EU from a move towards a cost-efficient supervisory 
system. To this end, we assume that we would have a supervisory system where 
all economies of scale would be realised for the whole of the EU. 
By inserting the values of the explanatory variables for the whole of the EU in 
the estimated cost function, we obtain predictions. Using supervisory staff as the 
proxy for the supervisory cost, we obtain a prediction of the staff size that would 
be necessary to supervise the European banking market in a cost-efficient 
European supervisory system. The potential staff saving is then calculated by 
subtracting this predicted EU staff size from the actual EU staff level.  
Based on overall fit and plausibility we use the following estimation equations 
for the predictions: With ASSETS as the supervisory output variable we use 
specifications (3) and (4) from Table 1; with DEPOSITS specifications (3) and 
(4) from Table 2; and with CLAIMS specifications (2), (3), (5), and (6) from 
Table 3. We do not use estimation results with BANKS as the supervisory output 
variable for making predictions. 
With respect to EU values of the explanatory variables the following applies 
(see Table A4 in the Appendix for summary statistics): We use 2002 data. For 
ASSETS, DEPOSITS, and CLAIMS we use the sum of the national values; for 
GDPCAP the weighted EU average. Moreover, we assume that at the European 
level the ECB would not be involved in banking supervision (CB takes the value 
0); and that – as in all EU countries – there would be explicit deposit insurance 
(DI takes the value 1). 
No data for the whole EU is available for the variables HOMOGEN, CONCA and 
CONCD. Taking (weighted) averages would be misleading since the EU banking 
market as a whole is most likely more heterogeneous and less concentrated than 
any single national market. Therefore, we differentiate scenarios based on 
different assumptions with respect to the homogeneity and the concentration of 
the EU banking market. We assume that HOMOGEN takes the values 0.45 (the 
weighted EU average), 0.33, and 0.1, respectively. Recall that lower values 
indicate a more heterogeneous market. According to the construction of this 
variable (cf. Table A1) the lowest possible value would be 0.33. However, it is 
reasonable to assume a lower value for the EU banking market as a whole since 
differences between national markets increase heterogeneity at the EU level. 
 12
Moreover, we assume that the concentration variable CONCA/CONCD takes 
values of 40.69/38.19 (the weighted EU average), 20, and 10, respectively. 
These assumptions result in nine different scenarios for the prediction of the EU 
staff size. 
Table 6 shows the predicted staff size and the percentage staff saving (in 
parentheses) for these nine scenarios. Each column in the table represents one of 
the estimation equations selected for making predictions. The first two with 
ASSETS as the supervisory output variable; the second two with DEPOSITS; 
and the final four with CLAIMS. Each row in the table represents one of the nine 
scenarios. 
   - insert Table 6 about here - 
Not surprisingly, the predicted EU staff size depends heavily on the assumptions 
regarding the homogeneity and the concentration of the EU banking market. The 
more heterogeneous and the less concentrated the banking market, the higher 
predicted staff size, and thus the lower potential staff savings. 
Assuming that the variables HOMOGEN and CONCA/COND take the average value 
of the EU countries (scenario 1), results in predicted EU staff size that lies 
between 657 and 917 persons, or staff savings of between 75 and 83 percent. Of 
course these numbers are anything but realistic. The reason for that are the 
assumptions that the EU banking market as a whole exhibits the same level of 
homogeneity and concentration as the average national EU market. Clearly, this 
is not reasonable. 
More reasonable is to assume lower levels of homogeneity and concentration 
which also lowers the potential staff savings. For instance, the scenario 7 
assumes HOMOGEN to be 0.1 and CONCA/CONC to be 20. National differences 
will cause the EU banking market to be always more heterogeneous than any 
national banking market and, therefore, make its supervision a rather complex 
undertaking. Thus, a value for the variable HOMOGEN significantly lower than 
the minimum of 0.44 in the EU sample is justified. With respect to 
concentration, it seems plausible that a future EU banking market will see some 
truly European (or even global) players, which account for a significant share of 
the market. Thus, assuming a value of 20 for the variable CONCA/CONCD, i.e. a 
market share of 20 percent of the top 5 banks, seems to be reasonable (at least in 
the foreseeable future). For comparison, in Germany (the least concentrated 
market in the EU) CONCA is 20 and CONCD is 21. 
For instance, in the plausible scenario 7 predicted EU staff size lies between 
2410 and 3303 depending on the specification of the underlying estimation 
equation. This corresponds to a potential staff saving of between 12 and 36 
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percent. In the case of the specification (3) with ASSETS as the output variable 
(first column in Table 6) which is the specification with the best overall fit, EU 
staff size is predicted to be 3188.4 This corresponds to a saving in staff and, 
hence, institutional costs of some 15 percent. 
4 Conclusions 
Against the background of the increasing integration of financial markets in the 
EU, the persisting fragmentation of financial supervision causes additional 
supervisory cost. These include institutional costs, firm’s compliance costs, and 
opportunity costs. The aim of this paper is to assess these costs of supervisory 
fragmentation and, as a consequence, the extent of potential cost savings with a 
cost-efficient European supervisory system. 
In a first step we estimate supervisory cost functions employing a large cross-
country database. The results clearly indicate that there exists increasing 
economies of scale in banking supervision. An increase in supervisory output 
(measured by the size of the banking market) by one percent, causes institutional 
supervisory cost (measured by supervisory staff) to rise by only some 0.5 
percent. 
In a second step, we predict the staff size of a cost-efficient European 
supervisory system assuming that all economies of scale could be realised for 
the whole of the EU. In a plausible scenario the resulting savings would amount 
to a reduction of EU supervisory staff and, hence, of institutional supervisory 
cost of some 15 percent.  
Taking predictions one step further, one can generalise the results obtained for 
the institutional costs to the other types of supervisory cost. There is a strong 
link between the institutional costs, for which we quantified cost savings and the 
costs of compliance that can be attributed to the regulated firms. Institutional 
costs are born by the regulated industry through fees, which constitute direct 
compliance costs. Thus, a reduction in institutional costs on the one hand, means 
a reduction in the firm’s direct compliance costs on the other. Besides, since 
supervisory agencies demand information which financial companies have to 
supply, overall compliance costs at the firm level should rise with the size and 
the budget of the supervisory agency.5 Thus, even if the predicted savings in 
                                           
4 Note that specification (4) with ASSETS as the output variable has a slightly higher R-
squared. However, in this specification the variable MULTI is included which is 
insignificant and does take the wrong sign. 
5Based on a survey Franks et al. (1998) reports average ratios of total compliance costs to 
institutional costs of 4.7 for investment management firms and 7.1 for securities firms. In 
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supervisory staff appear to be modest in absolute terms it hints to much higher 
cost savings in the economy as a whole. Overall, the analysis in this paper 
provides clear empirical evidence for the existence of economies of scale in 
financial supervision. 
 
                                                                                                                                   
the context of the UK’s Financial Services Act Lomax (1987) estimates compliance costs 
to be five times as much as direct costs. 
 15
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Table 1: Estimation results with STAFF as the dependant variable and ASSETS as the supervisory output variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ASSETS 0.5115***
(0.000) 
0.5034*** 
(0.000) 
0.5009***
(0.000) 
0.5024***
(0.000) 
0.5087***
(0.000) 
0.5108***
(0.000) 
0.4825***
(0.000) 
0.4978***
(0.000) 
0.5040***
(0.000) 
HOMOGEN -0.4984*
(0.054) 
-0.5951*** 
(0.010) 
-0.5706**
(0.016) 
-0.5777**
(0.014) 
-0.4992*
(0.053) 
-0.4926*
(0.051) 
-0.2832 
(0.335) 
-0.3791 
(0.137) 
-0.3958 
(0.124) 
CONCA -0.2677 
(0.157) 
-0.3290* 
(0.075) 
-0.3415**
(0.050) 
-0.3475*
(0.051) 
-0.2674 
(0.155) 
-0.2475 
(0.195) 
   
DRATES       0.0595 
(0.492) 
0.0921 
(0.263) 
0.0884 
(0.280) 
NPL 0.1002 
(0.145) 
   0.0956 
(0.153) 
0.1230**
(0.049) 
0.1009 
(0.179) 
  
MULTI -0.1099 
(0.663) 
  -0.0818 
(0.713) 
 -0.0700 
(0.784) 
0.1734 
(0.524) 
0.1843 
(0.432) 
 
CB 0.2461 
(0.101) 
 0.3193**
(0.015) 
0.3301**
(0.012) 
0.2368 
(0.121) 
 0.2254 
(0.146) 
0.3147**
(0.018) 
0.3442**
(0.011) 
DI 0.4719***
(0.001) 
0.4141*** 
(0.003) 
0.4861***
(0.001) 
0.4926***
(0.001) 
0.4623***
(0.001) 
0.4174***
(0.002) 
0.4890***
(0.001) 
0.5241***
(0.001) 
0.5393***
(0.001) 
GDPCAP -0.4835***
(0.000) 
-0.5317*** 
(0.000) 
-0.5126***
(0.000) 
-0.5136***
(0.000) 
-0.4819***
(0.000) 
-0.4885***
(0.000) 
-0.4904***
(0.000) 
-0.5388***
(0.000) 
-0.5467***
(0.000) 
Constant -3.8370***
(0.005) 
-2.7072*** 
(0.036) 
-3.0020**
(0.018) 
-3.0081**
(0.018) 
-3.7800***
(0.006) 
-3.7046***
(0.007) 
-4.1424***
(0.004) 
-4.1419***
(0.001) 
-4.2278***
(0.000) 
R-squared 0.6950 0.7016 0.7120 0.7124 0.6942 0.6890 0.6817 0.7031 0.7010 
N 140 153 150 150 140 143 123 135 135 
Notes: With the exception of the dummy variables MULTI, CB, and DI, all variables are taken in logarithms. P-values in parentheses; using 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from OLS regressions; ***, **, * indicates 1, 5, 10% significance level. 
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Table 2: Estimation results with STAFF as the dependant variable and DEPOSITS as the supervisory output variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DEPOSITS 0.4887***
(0.000) 
0.4885*** 
(0.000) 
0.4882***
(0.000) 
0.4889***
(0.000) 
0.4877***
(0.000) 
0.4854***
(0.000) 
0.4555***
(0.000) 
0.4723***
(0.000) 
0.4799***
(0.000) 
HOMOGEN -0.4690*
(0.087) 
-0.5746** 
(0.016) 
-0.5517**
(0.023) 
-0.5544**
(0.021) 
-0.4696*
(0.085) 
-0.4665*
(0.081) 
-0.1897 
(0.559) 
-0.2750 
(0.334) 
-0.2957 
(0.301) 
CONCD -0.1710***
(0.000) 
-0.1895*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1885***
(0.000) 
-0.1887***
(0.000) 
-0.1716***
(0.000) 
-0.1692***
(0.000) 
   
DRATES       0.1041 
(0.372) 
0.1365 
(0.226) 
0.1322 
(0.233) 
NPL 0.0934 
(0.182) 
   0.0916 
(0.178) 
0.1140* 
(0.072) 
0.1099 
(0.171) 
  
MULTI -0.0410 
(0.886) 
  -0.0274 
(0.912) 
 -0.0017 
(0.995) 
0.2522 
(0.404) 
0.2433 
(0.352) 
 
CB 0.2358 
(0.123) 
 0.3093**
(0.021) 
0.3128**
(0.018) 
0.2324 
(0.136) 
 0.1973 
(0.220) 
0.2889**
(0.035) 
0.3275**
(0.018) 
DI 0.5710***
(0.000) 
0.5211*** 
(0.000) 
0.5905***
(0.000) 
0.5927***
(0.000) 
0.5672***
(0.000) 
0.5175***
(0.000) 
0.5423***
(0.001) 
0.5862***
(0.000) 
0.6076***
(0.000) 
GDPCAP -0.4530***
(0.000) 
-0.5034*** 
(0.000) 
-0.4871***
(0.000) 
-0.4875***
(0.000) 
-0.4525***
(0.000) 
-0.4552***
(0.000) 
-0.4375***
(0.000) 
-0.4891***
(0.000) 
-0.4986***
(0.000) 
Constant -3.7393***
(0.000) 
-2.9746*** 
(0.000) 
-3.3448***
(0.000) 
-3.3577***
(0.000) 
-3.7155***
(0.000) 
-3.4993***
(0.000) 
-3.7916**
(0.014) 
-3.7755***
(0.004) 
-3.8806***
(0.000) 
R-squared 0.6529 0.6642 0.6741 0.6741 0.6528 0.6472 0.6340 0.6594 0.6558 
N 140 153 150 150 140 143 123 135 135 
Notes: With the exception of the dummy variables MULTI, CB, and DI, all variables are taken in logarithms. P-values in parentheses; using 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from OLS regressions; ***, **, * indicates 1, 5, 10% significance level. 
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Table 3: Estimation results with STAFF as the dependant variable and CLAIMS as the supervisory output variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CLAIMS 0.4187***
(0.000) 
0.4190*** 
(0.000) 
0.4180***
(0.000) 
0.4633***
(0.000) 
0.4556***
(0.000) 
0.4554***
(0.000) 
0.4784***
(0.000) 
0.4948***
(0.000) 
0.4991***
(0.000) 
HOMOGEN -0.4962*
(0.058) 
-0.5090** 
(0.030) 
-0.5051**
(0.033) 
-0.6221**
(0.023) 
-0.6672***
(0.006) 
-0.6664***
(0.007) 
-0.4106 
(0.177) 
-0.5011*
(0.069) 
-0.5162*
(0.065) 
CONCA -0.6359***
(0.004) 
-0.6586*** 
(0.001) 
-0.6530***
(0.001) 
      
CONCD    -0.2229**
(0.014) 
-0.2389**
(0.012) 
-0.2388**
(0.012) 
   
DRATES       0.0035 
(0.971) 
0.0308 
(0.744) 
0.0274 
(0.767) 
NPL 0.0383 
(0.589) 
  0.0364 
(0.603) 
  0.0767 
(0.250) 
  
MULTI -0.0582 
(0.825) 
-0.0607 
(0.793) 
 -0.0214 
(0.936) 
-0.0085 
(0.971) 
 0.1556 
(0.547) 
0.1282 
(0.555) 
 
CB 0.2830* 
(0.067) 
0.3421*** 
(0.010) 
0.3328**
(0.011) 
0.2660* 
(0.082) 
0.3224**
(0.014) 
0.3211**
(0.015) 
0.2374 
(0.122) 
0.2983**
(0.026) 
0.3195**
(0.019) 
DI 0.6274***
(0.000) 
0.6486*** 
(0.000) 
0.6438***
(0.000) 
0.6654***
(0.000) 
0.6852***
(0.000) 
0.6815***
(0.000) 
0.6439***
(0.000) 
0.6410***
(0.000) 
0.6533***
(0.000) 
GDPCAP -0.4206***
(0.000) 
-0.4388*** 
(0.000) 
-0.4378***
(0.000) 
-0.4451***
(0.000) 
-0.4628***
(0.000) 
-0.4626***
(0.000) 
-0.5062***
(0.000) 
-0.5438***
(0.000) 
-0.5491***
(0.000) 
Constant -0.3131 
(0.846) 
-0.0822 
(0.956) 
-0.0854 
(0.954) 
-2.6811***
(0.008) 
-2.5442***
(0.010) 
-2.5405***
(0.010) 
-3.5851***
(0.001) 
-3.6783***
(0.000) 
-3.7359***
(0.000) 
R-squared 0.6744 0.6997 0.6994 0.6648 0.6890 0.6890 0.6777 0.6942 0.6932 
N 138 148 148 138 148 148 123 138 138 
Notes: With the exception of the dummy variables MULTI, CB, and DI, all variables are taken in logarithms. P-values in parentheses; using 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from OLS regressions; ***, **, * indicates 1, 5, 10% significance level. 
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Table 4: Estimation results with STAFF as the dependant variable and BANKS as the supervisory output variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
BANKS 0.5904***
(0.000) 
0.5516*** 
(0.000) 
0.5492***
(0.000) 
0.6397***
(0.000) 
0.6171***
(0.000) 
0.6149***
(0.000) 
0.6194***
(0.000) 
0.5964***
(0.000) 
0.6046***
(0.000) 
HOMOGEN -0.3016 
(0.325) 
-0.4176 
(0.137) 
-0.4126 
(0.144) 
-0.3520 
(0.259) 
-0.5059*
(0.069) 
-0.5021*
(0.073) 
-0.2849 
(0.393) 
-0.5482*
(0.065) 
-0.5649*
(0.061) 
CONCA -0.3725 
(0.177) 
-0.4746* 
(0.075) 
-0.4720*
(0.076) 
      
CONCD    -0.1181**
(0.035) 
-0.1428**
(0.014) 
-0.1432**
(0.013) 
   
DRATES       0.6194 
(0.232) 
-0.1678 
(0.129) 
-0.1735 
(0.124) 
NPL 0.1564* 
(0.080) 
  0.1631* 
(0.065) 
  0.2077**
(0.024) 
  
MULTI -0.0435 
(0.874) 
-0.0635 
(0.807) 
 -0.0346 
(0.900) 
-0.0452 
(0.863) 
 0.2064 
(0.475) 
0.1533 
(0.572) 
 
CB 0.0806 
(0.650) 
0.2056 
(0.207) 
0.1978 
(0.226) 
0.0575 
(0.741) 
0.1786 
(0.266) 
0.1733 
(0.282) 
-0.0567 
(0.747) 
0.0851 
(0.610) 
0.1081 
(0.517) 
DI 0.5643***
(0.001) 
0.6360*** 
(0.000) 
0.6313***
(0.000) 
0.5661***
(0.001) 
0.6349***
(0.000) 
0.6318***
(0.000) 
0.5684***
(0.002) 
0.6440***
(0.000) 
0.6571***
(0.000) 
GDPCAP -0.0712 
(0.303) 
-0.1206* 
(0.066) 
-0.1205*
(0.065) 
-0.0743 
(0.284) 
-0.1289**
(0.048) 
-0.1287**
(0.047) 
-0.0987 
(0.236) 
-0.1852**
(0.014) 
-0.1886**
(0.013) 
Constant 3.4569**
(0.011) 
4.4440*** 
(0.001) 
4.4415***
(0.001) 
2.2445***
(0.000) 
2.8973***
(0.000) 
2.9056***
(0.000) 
2.2737***
(0.006) 
3.1395***
(0.000) 
3.1414***
(0.000) 
R-squared 0.5511 0.5680 0.5677 0.5490 0.5633 0.5632 0.5750 0.5690 0.5675 
N 140 150 150 140 150 150 123 138 138 
Notes: With the exception of the dummy variables MULTI, CB, and DI, all variables are taken in logarithms. P-values in parentheses; using 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from OLS regressions; ***, **, * indicates 1, 5, 10% significance level. 
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Table 5: Estimation results with BUDGET as the dependant variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ASSETS 0.4654***
(0.000) 
0.4754*** 
(0.000) 
        
DEPOSITS   0.4561***
(0.000) 
0.4608***
(0.000) 
      
CLAIMS     0.4744***
(0.000) 
0.4916***
(0.000) 
0.5194***
(0.000) 
   
BANKS        0.5365***
(0.001) 
0.4881***
(0.000) 
0.5058***
(0.000) 
HOMOGEN 0.4657 
(0.451) 
0.2899 
(0.674) 
0.3235 
(0.598) 
0.2547 
(0.709) 
0.4959 
(0.431) 
0.6465 
(0.254) 
0.5611 
(0.354) 
0.4234 
(0.514) 
0.5291 
(0.375) 
0.3512 
(0.575) 
CONCA -0.3192 
(0.429) 
   -0.5179* 
(0.084) 
  -0.2027 
(0.660) 
  
CONCD   -0.2630***
(0.000) 
  -0.2534***
(0.000) 
  -0.1685**
(0.032) 
 
DRATES  0.5996*** 
(0.000) 
 0.6309***
(0.000) 
  0.4791***
(0.002) 
  0.3830* 
(0.054) 
NPL -0.0810 
(0.551) 
-0.2182* 
(0.088) 
-0.1129 
(0.405) 
-0.2302* 
(0.070) 
-0.1069 
(0.414) 
  -0.0240 
(0.862) 
  
MULTI -0.0045 
(0.995) 
0.1997 
(0.817) 
0.0167 
(0.982) 
0.2017 
(0.815) 
-0.2192 
(0.797) 
-0.3622 
()0.640 
0.0148 
(0.985) 
0.0730 
(0.920) 
-0.0902 
(0.895) 
0.2572 
(0.738) 
CB -0.2184 
(0.617) 
-0.1628 
(0.704) 
-0.1980 
(0.652) 
-0.1381 
(0.748) 
-0.1319 
(0.760) 
-0.1851 
(0.648) 
-0.4398 
(0.347) 
-0.2660 
(0.543) 
-0.2865 
(0.484) 
-0.6350 
(0.183) 
DI 0.8281** 
(0.016) 
0.6033** 
(0.038) 
0.9702***
(0.006) 
0.6746** 
(0.021) 
0.9580***
(0.004) 
1.0606***
(0.002) 
0.6752* 
(0.062) 
0.7537** 
(0.033) 
0.8731** 
(0.015) 
0.5820 
(0.120) 
GDPCAP -0.0193 
(0.893) 
-0.0150 
(0.904) 
-0.0080 
(0.947) 
0.0137 
(0.906) 
-0.0577 
(0.658) 
-0.0624 
(0.579) 
0.0244 
(0.826) 
0.3887***
(0.002) 
0.3605***
(0.000) 
0.4547***
(0.000) 
Constant 5.2897* 
(0.075) 
2.9715 
(0.136) 
5.2764***
(0.000) 
3.1973 
(0.116) 
6.5410***
(0.001) 
5.0043***
(0.000) 
2.0286 
(0.224) 
10.802***
(0.000) 
11.028***
(0.000) 
8.9813***
(0.000) 
R-squared 0.4969 0.5286 0.5053 0.5294 0.5529 0.5673 0.5189 0.4663 0.4749 0.4258 
N 85 80 85 80 84 89 89 85 90 89 
Notes: With the exception of the dummy variables MULTI, CB, and DI, all variables are taken in logarithms. P-values in parentheses; using 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from OLS regressions; ***, **, * indicates 1, 5, 10% significance level. 
 22
Table 6: Predicted EU staff size and potential staff saving (in percent) in different scenarios 
 ASSETS as output variable 
(Table 1) 
DEPOSITS as output variable 
(Table 2) 
CLAIMS as output variable (Table 3) 
Scenarios (explanatory 
variables assumptions) 
Specification 
(3) 
Specification 
(4) 
Specification 
(3) 
Specification 
(4) 
Specification 
(2) 
Specification 
(3) 
Specification 
(5) 
Specification 
(6) 
1. HOMOGEN and 
CONCA/D: averages 
900 
(-76.0) 
917 
(-75.6) 
794 
(-78.9) 
799 
(-78.7) 
665 
(-82.3) 
657 
(-82.5) 
717 
(-80.9) 
716 
(-80.9) 
2. HOMOGEN=0.33 
CONCA/D: averages 
1265 
(-66.3) 
1295 
(-65.5) 
1104 
(-70.6) 
1113 
(-70.4) 
902 
(-76.0) 
889 
(-76.3) 
1069 
(-71.5) 
1067 
(-71.6) 
3. HOMOGEN=0.1 
CONCA/D: averages 
2501 
(-33.4) 
2581 
(-31.3) 
2133 
(-43.2) 
2157 
(-42.5) 
1656 
(-55.9) 
1624 
(-56.7) 
2371 
(-36.8) 
2364 
(-37.0) 
4. HOMOGEN: average 
CONCA/D=20 
1147 
(-69.5) 
1173 
(-68.7) 
897 
(-76.1) 
903 
(-76.0) 
1062 
(-71.7) 
1045 
(-72.2) 
837 
(-77.7) 
836 
(-77.7) 
5. HOMOGEN: average 
CONCA/D=10 
1453 
(-61.3) 
1493 
(-60.2) 
1022 
(-72.8) 
1029 
(-72.6) 
1676 
(-55.3) 
1643 
(-56.2) 
988 
(-73.7) 
986 
(-73.7) 
6. HOMOGEN=0.33 
CONCA/D=20 
1613 
(-57.0) 
1657 
(-55.9) 
1247 
(-66.8) 
1257 
(-66.5) 
1440 
(-61.7) 
1413 
(-62.4) 
1248 
(-66.8) 
1244 
(-66.8) 
7. HOMOGEN=0.1 
CONCA/D=20 
3188 
(-15.1) 
3303 
(-12.0) 
2410 
(-35.8) 
2437 
(-35.1) 
2643 
(-29.6) 
2583 
(-31.2) 
2767 
(-26.3) 
2758 
(-26.5) 
8. HOMOGEN=0.33 
CONCA/D=10 
2044 
(-45.6) 
2109 
(-43.8) 
1421 
(-62.1) 
1432 
(-61.8) 
2272 
(-39.5) 
2222 
(-40.8) 
1472 
(-60.8) 
1469 
(-60.9) 
9. HOMOGEN=0.1 
CONCA/D=10 
4039 
(7.6) 
4203 
(12.0) 
2746 
(-26.9) 
2778 
(-26.0) 
4172 
(11.1) 
4061 
(8.2) 
3265 
(-13.0) 
3255 
(-13.3) 
Notes: All values refer to the year 2002. The relative staff savings (in parentheses) measure the excess staff (difference between the predicted staff size for the whole of the 
EU and the sum of the actual staff levels for every EU country which was 3754 in the year 2002) divided by the actual EU staff level. Thus, a negative percentage indicates 
a potential staff saving, i.e. the predicted EU staff size is lower than the actual EU staff level. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variables, definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 2002 data Source 1999 data 
BUDGET Total budget for banking supervision 
(in USD) 
WB 2003 WB 1999 
STAFF Total number of professional bank 
supervisors 
WB 2003 WB 1999 
ASSETS Total bank assets (in USD) WB 2003, ECB 
(2002)1 
OCC, ECB (2002)1 
DEPOSITS Total bank deposits (in USD) WB 2003, ECB 
(2002)1 
OCC, ECB (2002)1 
CLAIMS Bank claims on private sector (in USD) IFS (line 22d) IFS (line 22d) 
BANKS Number of banks WB 2003 OCC, Barth et al. 
(2002) 
HOMOGEN Variable indicating how homogeneous 
the banking market is. This variable is 
constructed by summing up the squared 
percentage of banking system’s assets 
in banks that are 50% or more 
government owned, foreign owned, and 
privately domestic owned, respectively. 
By definition this variable ranges from 
0.33 to 1; 1 indicating the highest 
degree of homogeneity. 
Authors (percentage 
of assets that are 
government and 
foreign owned: WB 
2003) 
Authors (percentage 
of assets that are 
government and 
foreign owned: WB 
1999) 
CONCA Fraction of assets held by the 5 (for 
2002 data)/3 (for 1999 data) largest 
banks (in percent) 
WB 2003 OCC 
CONCD Fraction of deposits held by the 5 (for 
2002 data)/3 (for 1999 data) largest 
banks (in percent) 
WB 2003 OCC 
DRATES Lending minus deposit rate (5 year 
average) 
IFS (lines 60l and 
60p) 
IFS (lines 60l and 
60p) 
NPL Non-performing loans ratio (in percent) WB 2003 OCC 
MULTI Dummy variable indicating whether 
there are multiple bank supervisory 
authorities (1:more than one bank 
supervisor) 
WB 2003 Barth et al. (2002) 
CB Dummy variable indicating whether the 
central bank is involved in bank 
supervision (1:central bank is involved) 
WB 2003 Barth et al. (2002) 
DI Dummy variable indicating whether 
there is explicit deposit insurance 
(1:explicit deposit insurance) 
WB 2003 World Bank deposit 
insurance database2 
GDPCAP GDP per capita (5 year average; 
constant 1995 USD) 
WDI WDI 
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Table A1: continued 
OECD OECD dummy (1:OECD member) Authors Authors 
EU15 EU15 dummy (1:EU15 member) Authors Authors 
EWU EWU dummy (1:EWU member) Authors Authors 
EU25 EU25 dummy (1:EU25 member) Authors Authors 
Note: WB 2003: 2003 World Bank survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision, WB 1999: 1999 World Bank 
survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision, a detailed description of this data as well as download: 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/bank_regulation.htm; OCC: Survey of the U.S. Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency; IFS: IMF’s International Financial Statistics; WDI: World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators 
1 For the countries Austria, France, and Ireland data from ECB (2002) 
2 A detailed description of this data as well as download 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/interest/confs/upcoming/deposit_insurance/data.htm 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Obs.
BUDGET 24,147,520 5,168,460 949,000,000 6,964 95,754,176 118
STAFF 143 52 2587 2 265 183
ASSETS 439 bn. 18.4 bn. 7,210 bn. 323,766 1,270 bn. 188
DEPOSITS 267 bn. 12.6 bn. 5,780 bn. 126,691 868 bn. 188
CLAIMS 189 bn. 6.93 bn. 5,080 bn. 1,000,000 697 bn. 222
BANKS 180 23 8,580 1 883 197
HOMOGEN 0.62 0.58 1.00 0.33 0.19 195
CONCA 64.69 64.80 100.00 14.00 22.06 179
CONCD 66.86 69.00 100.00 0.02 22.11 179
DRATES 8.76 6.40 55.54 0.18 8.53 198
NPL 8.19 6.30 38.52 0.05 8.25 172
MULTI 0.14 0 1 0 0.35 197
CB 0.71 1 1 0 0.46 194
DI 0.59 1 1 0 0.49 190
GDPCAPITA 8,780.48 3,028.36 52,943.40 142.68 11,640.18 226
OECD 0.26 0 1 0 0.44 226
EU 0.13 0 1 0 0.34 226
EWU 0.11 0 1 0 0.31 226
EU25 0.22 0 1 0 0.42 226
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Table A3: Countries included 
EU 15 countries OECD countries Others 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, 
Australia, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Iceland, 
Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Slovakia, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United 
States, 
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, 
Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia 
& Herzegovina, Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Estonia, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Lithuania, Macau, Macedonia, 
Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, 
Mauritius, Moldova, Morocco, 
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Puerto Rico, Romania, Rwanda, 
Samoa (Western), Saudi Arabia, 
Seychelles, Singapore, Slovenia, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. 
Kitts & Nevis, Sudan, Suriname, 
Swaziland, Tajikistan, Thailand, 
Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United 
Arab Emirates, Uruguay, 
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zimbabwe 
Note: Table displays all countries that are included in at least one regression. Not for all countries is data 
available for both 1999 and 2002. All EU countries are also OECD member countries. 
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Table A4: EU values of the explanatory variables used in the predictions (summary statistics) 
  EU 15 
Variable Value used 
for predictions 
Sum Weighted 
average 
Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. 
STAFF 3754 3754 250 30 1220 308
ASSETS 22050 bn. 22050 bn. 1470 bn. 102 bn. 5715 bn. 1794 bn.
DEPOSITS 11458 bn. 11458 bn. 764 bn. 35 bn. 3732 bn. 1167 bn.
CLAIMS 8562 bn. 8562 bn. 571 bn. 26 bn. 2236 bn. 706 bn.
HOMOGEN 0.45/0.33/0.1 0.60 1 0.71 0.44 1 0.22
CONCA 40.69/20/10 40.69 1 62.80 20.00 99.50 26.83
CONCD 38.19/20/10 38.19 2 64.75 21.00 99.70 27.66
MULTI 0 0.13 0 1 0.35
CB 0 0.53 0 1 0.52
DI 1 1.00 1 1 0.00
GDPCAPITA 20863 20863 3 27554 12447 52943 10225
Notes: All data refers to the year 2002. 1 ASSETS used as a weight; 2 DEPOSITS used as a weight; 3 population used as a weight. 
 
